Language and legitimation

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Abstract. The verb ‘to legitimate’ is often used in political discourse in a way that’s prima facie perplexing. To wit, it is often said that an actor legitimates a practice that is formally proscribed in the relevant context, e.g. that a worker telling sexist jokes legitimates sexual discrimination in the workplace. In order to clarify the meaning of statements like this, and show how they can sometimes be true and informative, we need an account of how something which is formally illegitimate can have a kind of ersatz legitimacy conferred on it, and how this can occur even when the actor ‘doing the legitimating’ lacks formal authority. I examine an account of this sort which makes reference to the phenomenon of ‘normalization’, and highlight some advantages that this account has in comparison an alternative account, which makes reference to the phenomenon of ‘licensed authority’.

1. Introduction

How should we understand the meaning of claims that have the form “A legitimates x”? More narrowly, how should we understand such claims in cases where x stands for something that is recognized as formally as illegitimate in the relevant context? Suppose I say to you “jokes that play on racist stereotypes legitimate racial discrimination in employment and education”. And suppose I say this in a context where such discrimination is subject to effective legal sanctions, and where we both know this. What am I trying to convey in this remark? I’m not saying that racist jokes formally nullify the legal restrictions on racial discrimination. And I’m obviously not saying that racist jokes somehow make racial discrimination ethically unproblematic. Rather, on the more plausible interpretation of my remark, I’m saying that racist
jokes give a kind of ersatz legitimacy or pseudo-legitimacy to discrimination, despite its official illegitimacy in the relevant context. But what does this claim amount to, exactly?

This isn’t only a matter of philosophical curiosity. Many people are sceptical about the idea that expressive acts are a key factor in sustaining social injustice, and about the critical buzzwords which are commonly used to articulate that idea. Claims about legitimation easily elicit such scepticism. If I say that A’s speech is problematic because it legitimates some injustice, x, it can seem like I’m just using an artful verbal trick to blame A for x, regardless of there being a specifiable causal relation between A’s speech and x. If I lack any evidence that A contributes to x, but I want to say something meatier than “A endorses x”, I can split the difference by saying “A legitimates x”. At any rate, that’s how things may appear to the sceptic.

There are good reasons to try to address this scepticism. First, it is a chance to sharpen our vocabulary. If legitimation-talk is gesturing towards some real, discernible phenomenon, then we should try to put a finer point on what that phenomenon is. Second, getting clear about what legitimation is may help us to explain why it’s wrong, in cases where it is wrong. And third, the sceptics may yet change their minds. Perhaps some readers will see this is naïve, but I am going to proceed on the assumption that people’s scepticism about progressive critical buzzwords is ingenuous. People are unclear about what these terms are supposed to mean, and they see them used in ways which suggest that they are merely rhetorically expedient tokens, whose meaning is ever-shifting and indeterminate. For some buzzwords this perception may have something to it, but I think it is off-target in this case. I will argue that there is a phenomenon which is fittingly referred to using legitimation-talk, and propose an account of the meaning of claims that have the form “A legitimates x” centered on this phenomenon. This account should be welcome to people making such claims, because it rebuts the charge that they’re trading in empty rhetoric. But it may also be useful for contesting instances of such claims, as it indicates what’s needed in order for “A legitimates x” to be true.

In §2 I do a little more conceptual housekeeping to distinguish our target concept, and identify the factors that need to be accounted for in an adequate account of it. In §3 I describe two phenomena which have been examined in philosophical work on speech and social justice, and which I think can be used as a starting-point for an account of our target concept. One phenomenon is exemplified in the kind of case where A expresses her views or preferences, and finds that others basically just accede to them, such that they come to be de facto markers of legitimacy in a local context, irrespective of the wider background facts about what is officially legitimate. Ishani Maitra offers an account of this phenomenon, and I follow her
in using the term ‘licensed authority’ to refer to it. The other phenomenon is exemplified in a case where A portrays some officially illegitimate thing, x, as if it were descriptively normal. On its face, a representation of x as normal doesn’t amount to an assertion of x’s legitimacy. But it can have a similar upshot, by activating de facto norms that enjoin people to go along with conventions of normalcy. By representing x as descriptively normal, A (sometimes) gives a kind of ersatz normative legitimacy to x. I allow that there is something to be said for both of these phenomena, in terms of how they can be used to formulate an account of the meaning of “A legitimates x”. But then in §4 I explore some theoretical advantages that an account of legitimation as normalization has over an account of legitimation as licensed authority.

2. Clarifying the target concept

So: we are investigating claims that have the form “A legitimates x”, where x stands for something that is illegitimate, in some official sense, in the relevant context. Consider, for example, Catharine MacKinnon’s claim that “pornography sexualizes rape, battery, sexual harassment, prostitution, and child sexual abuse”, and that it “thereby celebrates, promotes, authorizes, and legitimizes them”. Or consider Bhikhu Parekh’s claim that a moral climate which is built up and sustained by disparaging and offensive remarks serves to legitimate racial discrimination. Or consider Mari Matsuda’s claim that groups like the Klan legitimize illicit racist practices, and that their strength “derives from their offering legitimation… for otherwise socially unacceptable emotions of hate, fear, and aggression”. In each case there is some practice or state of affairs which is allegedly being made legitimate, but which the author—and by assumption, we, the readers—recognize as formally (and rightfully) illegitimate. And in each case this is said to be occurring due to

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2 Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Francis Biddle’s Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech” in *Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987): 163-97, at 171. In a similar vein, in her defense of MacKinnon’s view, Rae Langton says pornography subordinates women because it legitimates sexual violence; see “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts”, *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 22/4 (1993): 293-330, at 307. Briefly, I don’t think we learn much about our target concept by mimicking Langton and employing Austinian speech act theory to interpret the meaning of claims of the form “A legitimates x”. Even if legitimating can be characterized as a kind of illocutionary act, this leaves the crucial question on the table, namely what is the nature (including, for instance, the typical outcomes) of the illocutionary act we are postulating?

3 Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*, 2nd Edn (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), at 314. As this quotation shows, the terminology used to denote our target concept isn’t uniform; some authors say “A legitimizes x”, rather than “A legitimates x”, But nothing substantial hinges on this.

the communicative acts of a specifiable group of actors — actors who don’t enjoy recognized authority to alter the official legitimacy facts.5

This is a different concept than the one that the term ‘legitimation’ denotes in philosophical work on the authority of the state. When someone like Bernard Williams refers to the basic legitimation demand, he’s referring to the conditions that must be satisfied in order for a government’s exercise of authority to be rightful or justified.6 When someone like Jürgen Habermas speaks of a legitimation crisis, he’s referring to what a government loses when the citizenry no longer sees its authority as legitimate.7 The first usage is more normative, in that A’s being legitimated means that its exercise of authority is actually rendered normatively justified, whereas the second usage is more descriptive, insofar as A’s being legitimated only means that the legitimacy of its rule is accepted by the citizenry (rightly or wrongly). What is common to both usages, though, is that the thing gaining or losing legitimacy is a government, or a similar entity. By contrast, with the concept of legitimation that we’re homing in on, the practice or state of affairs which is legitimated, x, is something that conflicts with the de jure legitimacy standards, as they are enshrined in contextually-relevant institutions. With our concept, then, x will generally be a practice or state of affairs that is not enacted by government.8

One way that a practice can acquire ersatz legitimacy, despite conflicting with de jure legitimacy standards, is if a society’s allegiance to its de jure standards is subverted by systemic cultural-historical forces that operate beyond any individual’s control. The sociologist Cecilia Ridgeway says that in a society where one group gains material advantages over another, and where this influences subsequent interactions, the disparity gradually transforms “into status beliefs favoring the advantaged social category” in a

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5 Although each of these examples refers to something wrongful/being legitimated, note that, in principle, we can also speak of things that have a positive valence being legitimated. Such cases still exemplify the formal features of the concept we’re investigating, but their inverted normative valence makes them atypical examples.

6 For Williams it’s a condition of government’s legitimacy that it resolves ‘the first political question’, i.e. secures basic order in a way that’s justifiable to each subject; see “Realism and Moralism in Political Theory” in In the Beginning W as the Deck Realism and Moralism in Political Argument (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005): 1-17.

7 Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).

8 We find a distinctive technical usage of our target concept in an influential paper by the critical legal theorist Alan David Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine”, Minnesota Law Review 62/6 (1978): 1049-119. Freeman argues that the legal reforms stemming from the civil rights movement legitimated the social order they were meant to transform. Specifically, while antidiscrimination law purported to overturn identity-based social hierarchy, it actually entrenched it, by marking certain forms of racial discrimination as legally and socially acceptable. Note that Freeman’s view of the law is crucially unlike the one that underpins our target concept. In a society where racial discrimination is unlawful, the person who says “racist jokes legitimate racism” insists that such laws are insufficient to delegitimize racism. By contrast, Freeman is claiming that such laws can positively impair efforts to delegitimize racism.
way that “legitimize[s] the structural inequality” between the groups.9 Ridgeway is thus using legitimation-talk to refer to a process in which racial hierarchies come to be seen as acceptable, regardless of any de jure guarantees of social equality. And there is nothing inapt about this usage, in principle. But note that this sort of legitimation, if we are happy to call it that, isn’t the same phenomenon that’s adverted to in the characteristic usage of our target concept, as outlined above. It wouldn’t make sense, on Ridgeway’s picture, to say that a specific agent or group is doing the legitimating. The processes that she is talking about arise out of innumerable many acts, of many different kinds, performed by people who occupy a whole variety of roles and positions in the social ecosystem. By contrast, MacKinnon is claiming that pornographers legitimate sexual violence. Matsuda is claiming that the Klan legitimates racism. Even if we grant that macro-level social forces sometimes cause the state’s legally-underwritten legitimacy standards to be overridden by rival, de facto standards of conduct, we still have the question of when (if ever) it makes sense for the Klan, or the purveyors of pornography, or some other specifiable individual or group, to be nominated as the party that is setting these rival, overriding standards in place.10

This question only really becomes puzzling in those cases where the actors who convey their support for x, and thereby lend a kind of legitimacy to x, do not occupy a formal position of political or legal leadership. In the kind of case where a formally egalitarian state elects an anti-egalitarian President, who then derides certain egalitarian legal requirements that obtain in that state, it is easier to see how we get the kind of conflict which characterizes our target concept, i.e. between de jure and de facto legitimacy facts. Some official, legal source of information about what is legitimate says one thing. But the leader, who also has some authority to say what is legitimate – at minimum, some de facto authority – says another. When this occurs there isn’t any grand mystery about how the formally illegitimate behavior might acquire a kind of pseudo-legitimacy. And some uses of legitimation-talk refer to cases like this. Again, though, our


10 Ridgeway follows many other social theorists who describe legitimation processes grounded in social forces that operate beyond any individual’s control, and who don’t nominate specific actors as the authors of these processes’ outcomes. For instance, the sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann use the term ‘legitimation’ to describe the process through which a confluence of social-historical forces cause cultural practices to acquire an appearance of objective reality; see The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966). Or as another example, Ernest Gellner speaks about the legitimation of belief, by which he means the process in which certain frameworks of understanding are privileged in deciding what ideas are taken seriously. Again, though, he doesn’t see this as something attributable to specific actors; it results from a confluence of cultural forces; see The Legitimation of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
question – the more puzzling question – is how a formally illegitimate behavior can be made pseudo-legitimate by actors who don’t enjoy such a position.11

In order for something formally illegitimate to become legitimated, in our target sense, one may imagine that it has to be made legitimate in a way that’s normatively equivalent to an act being legalized after having previously been legally proscribed. Something like this notion can be read into Robin West’s discussion of the idea that pornography legitimates sexual violence. West says “we should think of pornography as the authoritative ‘legal text’ – the Constitution, so to speak – of patriarchy”.12 In a liberal legal order, she says, “coercion is not required to secure compliance”; instead, “law replaces brute force” with a “hierarchy enforced… through the legalistic mechanisms of authoritative texts”13 West thinks pornography exerts control via this mechanism, as an authoritative text replacing institutional coercion.

This equivalence is difficult to pin down, though. If pornography legitimates sexual violence, it does so in a way that isn’t announced and backed up in the same way as the permissions granted by law. The state uses general taxes to fund a mass bureaucracy that coercively enforces compliance with precise-

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11 There are various present-day examples, like Trump, who, as Tam Warner Minton says, “does not espouse new belief systems, but brings out the old and familiar anger, hatred, racism, and sexism of his base”. “Trump legitimates these feelings”, she says; see “The charismatic appeal of Donald Trump”, Huffington Post Blog, 10th October 2016, via huffingtonpost.com/tam-warner-minton/the-charismatic-appeal-of-b_12406854.html. In §3 I discuss the idea that legally proscribed acts can be legitimated by being normalized. In this connection, note that Foucault characterizes the modern technocratic state’s power as being rooted in its ability to establish public standards of normalcy, and to use institutional mechanisms to pressure the citizenry to adhere to these standards, e.g. see the section on ‘Normalizing Judgement’ in Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd Edn, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1995). However, as I explain above, the puzzle that I am focusing on in this paper isn’t really in play in those cases where state actors are the ones normalizing, and thus conferring legitimacy upon, unjust practices. Also note that some Marxists postulate a subtly (but importantly) different account of the way in which state power is involved conferring legitimacy upon unjust practices. For some authors, it isn’t the state or its agencies which promulgate the belief-system that causes people to regard the status quo’s unjust practices as natural and legitimate; rather, it is the ruling class that purports legitimate the status quo. And while the ruling class routinely appropriates state power to this end, its interests aren’t identical to the state’s interests; see Brian Leiter, “Marx, Law, Ideology, Legal Positivism”, Virginia Law Review 101/4 (2015): 1179-96, at 1179-82.

12 Robin West, “Pornography as a Legal Text: Comments from a Legal Perspective” in Susan Gubar and Joan Hoff (Eds.), For Adult Users Only: The Dilemma of Violent Pornography (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989): 108-30, at 110. Langton argues that pornography is like the law because it shares various features with legal enactments, e.g. subordinating, setting norms, and expressing a certain kind of authority; see “Is Pornography like the Law?” in Mari Mikkola (Ed.), Beyond Speech: Pornography and Analytic Feminist Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 23-38. I do think we need to split hairs here, though, between saying, with Langton, that pornography has important features in common with law, and saying, with West, that pornography is equivalent to a legal text.

13 West, “Pornography as a Legal Text”: at 110, 117.
ly formulated standards of conduct. Pornographers don’t do any of this. West downplays the differences, because, again, she says that authoritative texts – rather than coercion – are enough to secure norm-compliance in a liberal legal system. Now, more needs to be said about how norms might be written into pornographic texts. But even if we set aside any misgivings related to this point, West’s claim about coercion seems unconvincing. While it’s true that coercion isn’t always needed to secure compliance in a liberal legal order, it’s misleading to say that coercion isn’t needed to secure compliance, period. This premise will only support West’s conclusion – about the parity in how pornography and legal texts bear authority – if we understand it as saying that people’s compliance with the law in a liberal society never (or almost never) relies upon coercion. But of course liberal regimes routinely need to enforce law coercively. Granted, many people internalize and voluntarily comply with legal standards much of the time. And this internalization may be, moreover, part of what the rule of law consists in. But the law’s action-guiding power still relies on the state’s monopolization of coercive force, and its ability to wield this in the service of its legal mandates. The pornographers’ ability to enforce mandates is loosely analogous at best.

What I’m driving at here is how difficult it is to locate an equivalence between the de facto legitimation of some act that was once formally proscribed, x, and the formal legalization of x. If we want to insist that “A legitimates x” is only true in cases where x becomes a socially permissible act in just the same way as it would have as a result of being legalized, then our target concept will becomes almost useless. Given such a specification of our concept’s truth conditions, all (or nearly all) of the claims that we’re interested in, of the form “A legitimates x”, will turn out to be straightforwardly false. What we are trying to specify, then, instead, to reiterate from §1, is some notion of ersatz or pseudo-legitimacy. We want to know how something that’s formally illegitimate could be made sort of legitimate – not the same as if it had been legalized, but authorized in a meaningfully similar sense, nevertheless – thanks to the activity of a person or group without any special, authorization-granting prerogatives.

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3. Two candidate phenomena

3.1 Legitimation as Licensed Authority

I’ll now discuss how an account of our target concept could be formulated with reference to the phenomenon that Maitra calls licensed authority. Maitra’s discussion of this phenomenon appears as part of an inquiry into the question of whether ordinary instances of hate speech can subordinate people in a way that’s akin to legal subordination – whether they can “rank their targets as inferior, deprive them of rights and powers, and legitimate discriminatory behavior towards them, just as the legislator’s utterance does”.17 As Maitra rightly notes, one obvious difference between legislation and ordinary hate speech is the difference in the authority underwriting them. She notes that this discrepancy has received plenty of attention in relation to claims about the harm of pornography, but less in relation to claims about the harm of hate speech.18 And this is surprising, as Maitra points out, because while it’s true that some hate speech comes from the mouths of political leaders, intellectual elites, and media companies, a great deal of hate speech – on the street, online, in the workplace, or in schools – comes from people who are relative nobodies in the larger social pecking order. Maitra is asking a question that’s broadly in line, then, with the one that we’ve been zeroing in on: how can this hate speech, by relative nobodies, carry the authority that’s needed to subordinate its targets, in a way that’s able to override the targets’ formally non-subordinate status?

Her contention is that the relevant form of authority “needn’t derive from social position at all”. People can effectively wield authority “even when they lack it prior to speaking”.19 To show how this occurs, she discusses some examples of people taking authority in a situation, despite not having any antecedent prerogative to do so. One of them is as follows.

**HIKE ORGANIZER:** A group of friends are planning a hike and discussing logistics: where to go, for how long, etc. Some people express mild preferences, but no one has strong views, and the discussion drags on until one person, Andy, decides to take over and make decisions. He assigns everyone a task.

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17 Maitra, “Subordinating speech”, at 95. Following Langton, Maitra understands these three things – (i) ranking people, (ii) legitimating discriminatory treatment, and (iii) depriving people of rights – as related elements of subordination. And while the paper of Maitra’s that I’m discussing focuses on the ‘ranking’ element, and how it can be authoritatively performed by people who lack positional authority, she also says the conception of authority that she articulates to this end applies, mutatis mutandis, to the other components of subordination; *Ibid* at 100.


one is to pick a location, another is to buy food, etc. No one objects, everyone completes their assigned tasks, and the hike runs smoothly.\textsuperscript{20}

Maitra says that Andy has a form of authority in this case that is similar to the speaker in the following case of ordinary hate speech, coming from someone without positional authority.

\textbf{SUBWAY RIDER:} An older white man walks up to an Arab woman on a crowded subway car, and says “F***in’ terrorist, go home”. The woman doesn’t respond. The man carries on, loud enough for all to hear. The rest of the car falls silent, but no one interferes.\textsuperscript{21}

The kind of authority that Andy exercises in HIKE ORGANIZER is, as Maitra concedes, unlike the lawmaker’s authority in several respects. Most obviously, it doesn’t involve institutional backing, and hence it lacks the kind of relatively uncontested status that legal authority carries in an effective legal system. In short, if the group rejects or ignores Andy’s instructions, then he doesn’t get to decide how things go. This is what makes the authority \textit{licensed}, on Maitra’s account. Andy’s audience gives him his authority.\textsuperscript{22}

Maitra then transposes her insights about Andy’s putative authority to the racist old man in \textit{SUBWAY RIDER}. He ranks his target as inferior, and because no-one challenges his speech, it is given authority and it succeeds in ranking her.\textsuperscript{23} Because the speaker has no actual positional authority, this outcome wouldn’t have resulted if the group hadn’t stayed silent. His speech carries an authoritative weight, then, but only because he has been handed a kind of local, spur-of-the-moment leadership.

This notion of licensed authority can be used to formulate an account of our target concept. Maitra says that when someone without formal authority legitimates discriminatory behavior this is the kind of authority they’re wielding.\textsuperscript{24} The proposal, then, would be that “A legitimates x” is true if or to the extent that A’s endorsement of x acquires licensed authority. In a context where racial discrimination is illegitimate from a formal institutional perspective, A can convey – verbally, most likely, but perhaps also non-verbally – the view that racially discriminatory behavior is in fact acceptable. And A may acquire licensed authority in doing this. The idea would be that this what A’s legitimation of discrimination consists in.

Although we haven’t yet examined this facet of our concept, notice that claims of the form “A legitimates x” generally carry an implicit qualification about \textit{who} – which people or groups falling under A’s

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid}, at 106. The example has been paraphrased and abridged.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid}, at 100-01. Again, this is paraphrased and abridged.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid}, at 107.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid}, at 115.

\textsuperscript{24} See “Subordinating speech”, footnote 31.
influence – x has been legitimated for. And notice, then, that an account of legitimation as licensed authority brings in a complication on this front. In cases like SUBWAY RIDER there is a speaker, a target, and some onlookers. One of the things that Maitra’s analysis stresses is the onlookers’ important role in the process through which the speaker acquires their authority. One of the peculiarities of this analysis, then – and I will return to this in §4 – is that the onlookers are simultaneously the audience for whom x is legitimated, and also integral participants in the social dynamics through which x is legitimated.

Notwithstanding this peculiar feature, this still looks like it could be a candidate solution to our puzzle. We are trying to identify a phenomenon in which something which is formally illegitimate is given an ersatz legitimacy, thanks to the conduct of actors without any special, norm-prescribing prerogatives. This seems like a more or less apt description of what’s going on in SUBWAY RIDER. And the HIKE ORGANIZER example shows that the phenomenon of licensed authority crops up in all sorts of social settings, and hence that it hasn’t just been theoretically reverse-engineered, in order to rationalize a prior conviction that the bigoted subway riders of this world are incommensurately terrible or powerful. Once we can name the phenomenon, we can articulate the nebulous sense we have (some of us) that the aggressive xenophobe on the subway wields a kind of authority, even though we know that he’s also just some random bloke. Various details about the phenomenon remain to be considered, including how much compliance we think ought to be required before we would say that the relevant kind of licensing is in effect. But the dynamic in question is a familiar one. Maitra’s description of it sharpens our apprehension of something about ordinary social intercourse that we already know of by acquaintance. If this phenomenon is what we are gesturing towards in our use of legitimation talk, it gives us a way of understanding how someone without political authority can impart pseudo-legitimacy to some activity which is formally illegitimate.

3.2 Legitimation as normalization

Let’s turn to an alternative account of our target concept. Several authors writing about social justice and speech allude to the phenomenon of normalization in their work, and it’s particularly emphasized by Rae Langton. For example, in response to Leslie Green’s remark that it is a mistake to think each instance of pornography carries the message “this is how sex works; this is right and proper”,25 Langton agrees, but counters that it would also be a mistake

25 Green, “Pornographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing”, at 296.
To think that everything that is a source of normative guidance bears the message “Look, this is how it is to be done: this is right and proper”. Pornography legitimates… certain ways of acting, in part by representing them as ordinary, and normal.\textsuperscript{26}

In essence, the proposal suggested in this is that “A legitimates x” is true if A effectively represents x as descriptively normal to some audience. Another place in contemporary scholarship where we find something like this understanding of legitimation is in the work of psychologists trying to explain how unjust social relations can come to have widespread support, including from victims of injustice themselves. Rui Costa-Lopes and his co-authors use the term legitimation to refer to “the social and psychological processes via which attitudes, behaviors, and social arrangements are justified as conforming to normative standards”.\textsuperscript{27} Now, ‘conforming to normative standards’ is ambiguous. Part of what these authors are adverti ng to is the way people in an unjust social order can acquire a belief-system – like what some critical theorists call an ideology – that makes the system appear fair, just, and reasonable. But they’re also interested in people “coming to see social inequality as not only legitimate but also natural and necessary”.\textsuperscript{28} In short, legitimation is about making the unjust seem normal.\textsuperscript{29}

This suggests a different type of process through which pseudo-legitimacy can be conferred upon an illegitimate practice or state of affairs, x, and a different explanation of how the putative ‘legitimator’, A, can fulfil a key role in this, which makes it fitting to attribute the outcome to their action. When A enjoys no formal authority, but A legitimates x by normalizing it, a fascinating complex of authority relations comes into effect. A doesn’t necessarily acquire any normative authority – not even evanescent, licensed authority – over the people for whom x is legitimated. Rather than making a bid for normative authority of his own, A commandeers and redirects a source of normative authority, which the audience for whom x is legitimated already recognize themselves as subject to. The source of authority in question is that which is embedded in the \textit{de facto} social norms that enjoin everyone to align their behavior to whatever practices are the descriptively normal ones in the relevant context.

\textsuperscript{26} Langton, “Subordination, Silence, and Pornography’s Authority”, at 269.


\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid}, at 232, my emphasis.

\textsuperscript{29} On the notion of ideology as a worldview that leads people to view an unjust social order as natural, see for instance Raymond Geuss, \textit{The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), at 9ff.
As Cristina Bicchieri and Hugo Mercier explain, an effective way to alter social norms is through dialogue that alters people’s expectations. And this is because social norms function in a way that relies on people’s expectations about how others will act. But it’s useful to prise apart the two types of expectations that Bicchieri and Mercier are referring to here: normative and empirical. If A has no authority to issue prescriptions for others, then he is obviously limited in his ability to change people’s understanding and expectations about which normative standards they ought to answer to. The best A can do is to air his views and hope that they’re taken up by others. But A will have an easier time shifting things if he’s trying to change people’s empirical expectations. In this case his audience’s ideas about the formal standards they ought to answer to don’t need to change. A can change a norm’s substantive content, even while its formal content – roughly: “conform your behavior to whatever is the ordinary or commonplace behavior in the relevant context” – remains fixed. All A needs to do, in essence, is to make it seem to others that the ordinary thing to do in context C is to φ, rather than to not φ. If A can achieve this, then the norm “conform your behavior to whatever is descriptively normal in the relevant context” becomes, to all practical purposes, a norm in favor of φ-ing in C. And hence a person without any formal authority, and with little more than the preparedness to speak or act in a manner which represents φ-ing as descriptively normal, can lead others to believe that it’s required of them to φ, lest they infringe against those generic social norms which tell us to follow crowds and not buck trends.

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31 While there are different ways to explain the exact mechanism through which the reasons for action generated by social norms get a purchase on agents, the essential idea in all accounts – including in David Lewis’s classic account of conventions (see “Languages and Language” in Keith Gunderson (Ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), and Cristina Bicchieri’s influential recent work (see The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)) – is that there are rules of conduct which we follow (unlike either coercively enforced laws, or purely personal standards that we set for ourselves) mainly because we believe most others are following them too.

32 Recent research by Adam Bear and Joshua Knobe supports the hypothesis that in being depicted as descriptively normal, things are made to seem normatively legitimate. Their key finding is that when asked what they believe are ‘normal’, ‘ideal’, and ‘average’ quantities of a variable, people’s judgments about normality deviate from judgments about descriptively typicality, in a way that’s influenced by judgments about ideal-nest. Judgments of normative ideal-ness and descriptive normality aren’t independent, then; they blend and influence each other; see “Normality: Part Descriptive, Part Prescriptive”, Cognition 167/1 (2017): 25-37. This builds on earlier research finding that children easily acquire views about what’s normatively ideal based on observations about descriptively typicality; see Marco F. H. Schmidt, Hannes Rakoczy, and Michael Tomasello, “Young Children Attribute Normativity to Novel Actions without Pedagogy or Normative Language”, Developmental Science 14/3 (2011): 530-39. And it dovetails with classic studies which find that focusing people’s attention on information about how others actually behave, instead of injunctive norms, has greater impact in influencing people to conform with social norms; see Robert B. Cialdini, Raymond R. Reno, and Carl A. Kallgren, “A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58/6 (1990): 1015-26.
This looks like another candidate solution to our puzzle, then. We are trying to identify a phenomenon in which something that is formally illegitimate is given an ersatz legitimacy, thanks to the activity of some person or group without any special norm-prescribing prerogatives. To a general approximation, this seems like an apt description of what is going on when something is normalized in the sense outlined above. Consider the issue Langton is addressing, of pornographers normalizing sexual violence towards women. We have a legally underwritten, background understanding that sexual violence is wrong. But pornography represents sexual violence towards women as ordinary and natural, and hence for those who absorb this representation, misogynistic sexual violence – regardless of its formal illegitimacy – acquires a kind of pseudo-legitimacy, in the same way that ‘doing what’s normal around here’ always enjoys a kind of pseudo-legitimacy. Again, various details and complexities in the phenomenon remain to be explored, and I will say more about some of these in the following section. But again, the dynamic is a one which is observable in all sorts of social contexts, and thus it looks like something more than just a convenient rationalization for our use of a political buzzword. As with licensed authority, if this phenomenon is what we’re gesturing towards in our use of legitimation talk, it gives us another way of making sense of how actors without any formal authority can impart pseudo-legitimacy to something which is formally illegitimate.

4. Authority and pre-emptive reasons

While there is something to be said for both accounts of legitimation – legitimation as licensed authority, and legitimation as normalization – we need to subject both of them to a little more critical pressure. Both accounts give us a sense of how a certain kind of ‘to-be-done-ness’ can be accorded to acts that are formally illegitimate. But still, we are flirting with an abuse of our concepts – a misrepresentation of what the words we are using really mean, and imply, and connote – in claiming that these acts are given legitimacy, even if only ersatz legitimacy. Nancy Bauer presses this worry, in a discussion of the alleged legitimating power of pornography. Any account of our target concept, she argues, will need to explain how the legitimation of some proscribed practice “provides its practitioners with [some type of] official, conventionally recognized justification for their action, should they find themselves in need of one”.33 It will be verging on meaningless to say that A legitimates ϕ-ing, for some other actor, B, if B acquires no passable excuse for his ϕ-ing, or his toleration of other people’s ϕ-ing – no way of saying “but I reasonably took ϕ-ing to be legitimate”. If ϕ-ing is legitimated for B, then there must be some sense in which B’s ϕ-

ing can be reasonably regarded as legitimate. And if B’s φ-ing patently cannot be regarded as legitimate, by any standard, then it cannot be true that φ-ing was legitimated, for B or for anyone else. In such a case, we will have to regard the claim that “A legitimates φ-ing” as, at best, an overegged way of saying “A endorses φ-ing”.

The guiding intuition here isn’t just about the pointlessness of having a concept whose applicability conditions are made overly-inclusive. The worry isn’t merely that the conjectures whose meaning we are trying to clarify – that pornography legitimates sexual violence, for example, or that racist jokes legitimate workplace discrimination – could end up being trivially true. The worry is that we are downright distorting our central, operative concept. To speak of ‘legitimation’ is to invoke a network of associated concepts and meanings which encompasses, among other things, notions of authority and lawfulness. To say that x is illegitimate isn’t just to say it’s wrong, but that it requires some authority or authorization which is lacking. And to say that x is legitimated isn’t just to say that it’s okay, but that the requisite authorization has been given. And the authorization in question is meant to be somehow law-like: the upshot of an authorizing procedure, not just a capricious sanction by someone wielding power.

It is useful, then, to reflect on the nature of legal authority. As Joseph Raz argues, relations of authority involve more than just one person getting their way over others. Authority relations involve a surrender of judgement by the subject, B, to some authority A’s ruling. A’s ruling replaces the reasons on which it depends, for B, in a way that settles the question for B of what she is required to do. If B is answering to an authority, then, with respect to some decision, whether to φ, B isn’t supposed to tally up her reasons for action, and then update the tally by counting A’s prohibition of φ-ing as a strong pro tanto reason against φ-ing. Rather, B is meant to take A’s prohibition of φ-ing as settling the question of whether she is allowed to φ, in a manner which forestalls any revision that might ensue as a result of her reviewing the first-order reasons there are concerning whether or not to φ. In short, the reasons for action that stem from an authoritative ruling are pre-emptive: they override the subject’s own reasons for action, with respect to the matter governed by the ruling, and import a verdict handed down by the authority’s appraisal of the reasons bearing on that matter.

Now, as I said at the end of §2, we shouldn’t equate our target concept with the idea of legalization. The two proposals in §3 are an attempt to say how something that’s formally illegitimate could be given ersatz legitimacy, not the same as if it had been legalized, but still, authorized in a meaningfully similar

sense. The question is: which dimension of similarity matters? The answer, I think – the way in which ersatz legitimacy must resemble official, de jure legitimacy – is that it should involve a displacement of people’s reasons for action. Suppose $\varphi$-ing is legally proscribed at time $t_1$, but then legally authorized at $t_2$. The fact that a subject, $B$, is forbidden to $\varphi$ at $t_1$, and permitted to $\varphi$ at $t_2$, owes to the legal authority’s edicts about $\varphi$-ing overriding $B$’s own assessment, at any given time, of her reasons for $\varphi$-ing or not $\varphi$-ing. Now, $B$ may happily comply with the requirements that she is subject to, or she may comply only begrudgingly, or she may positively rebel. But the fact that $B$ is subject to these requirements is independent of which of these stances she adopts. Again, to be clear, if you claim that $\varphi$-ing is legitimated, in examples like those in §1, you needn’t be insisting that the people for whom $\varphi$-ing is legitimated have their reasons for action displaced in a way that’s backed by institutional coercion, as is the case when reasons for action are displaced by legal authority. However, you are saying – at any rate, you really should be saying – that their reasons for action are displaced via some process or other. Because if this isn’t what’s occurring, then your claim seems hollow. As per Bauer’s objection, what we would want to say in reply to your claim, is that there just isn’t any sense in which $\varphi$-ing has been made legitimate for anyone: no good justification that a person could wheel out, if called upon to explain why they saw $\varphi$-ing as acceptable.

This worry seems inescapable for an account of “$A$ legitimates $x$” which is formulated with reference to Maitra’s notion of licensed authority. Maitra is arguing that in a case like SUBWAY RIDER, someone without recognized authority, $A$, is able to legitimate the discriminatory treatment of another person, $B$, in a way that’s relevantly similar to the law authorizing discriminatory treatment of $B$. Now, if $A$’s speech isn’t in fact authoritative, then $A$ is actually just a random nobody who is mistreating $B$, sans interference only because the bystanders are intimated or apathetic. Conversely, if we want to see $A$ as imparting legitimacy to his wrongful mistreatment of $B$, then we will have to insist that $A$ really is an authority, who is overriding the other passengers’ reasons, and compelling them to follow suit in his treatment of $B$. But by Maitra’s own lights, that isn’t what is taking place. The bystanders aren’t compelled by $A$’s authority to follow suit in his discriminatory treatment of $B$. The order of authorization is the other way around: $A$’s speech is authoritative because the bystanders go along with it. We can call this licensed authority, by way of stipulation. But it doesn’t bear the features of authority – specifically, the giving of pre-emptive reasons for action – which it needs in order to substantiate the idea that $A$ legitimates other people’s discriminatory treatment of $B$.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{36} Saray Ayala and Nadya Vasilyeva argue that responsibility for the oppressive ramifications of interactions like these, i.e. cases in which bystanders allow oppressive speech to go unchallenged, is shared between the speaker and the bystanders; see “Responsibility for Silence”, Journal of Social Philosophy 47/3 (2016): 256-72.
This should deter us from saying that A legitimates a formally proscribed act, \( \varphi \)-ing, if and when A's endorsement of \( \varphi \)-ing acquires licensed authority. We are battering our target concept out of shape, in allowing such an account of it, and also facilitating a subtle misrepresentation of the social dynamics and normative relations we are using it to refer to.\(^{37}\)

What about when it comes to legitimation as normalization? In this case there are further complexities such that, in some instances, the kind of conceptual misuse that I have just described isn’t in effect. Or so I will argue. The first thing to note, to this end, is that acting in line with what one takes to be the conventions of normal conduct, in a specific context, can be similar to following the law in the relevant sense. A convention which requires \( \varphi \)-ing will at least sometimes settle the question of whether I must \( \varphi \) in a way that – like a law which requires \( \varphi \)-ing – pre-emptively overrides my own reasoning about whether to \( \varphi \). This isn’t to say that a normative social convention literally \emph{forces} me to \( \varphi \), as if I were supernaturally possessed. (The law doesn’t do that either.) It means that on a certain level I am required to \( \varphi \), and that I’ll incur the burdens of not \( \varphi \)-ing, irrespective of my own reasoning on the issue.

One intuition that’s in effect here is about excusability. Every person’s behavior is cued in a pervasive and inescapable way by beliefs – often passively-acquired, and not fully critically-vetted beliefs – about the conventions that are in effect in the contexts in which she is acting. It isn’t just that being a rebel is socially costly, but that the level of conscious deliberation that would have to be expended in adhering to or resisting every convention on its independently-assessed merits would be computationally unmanageable for any human agent living in any moderately complex society. And if it is indeed unavoidable in some sense to be governed by one’s reasonable take on the local conventions of normal conduct, then acting wrongfully as a result of this should be at least partly excusable, for ‘ought-implies-can’-type reasons.

But this still leaves it to be explained why it would not be excusable, to the same degree, to have one’s view of what’s normal or appropriate behavior cued by a lone actor, who defies the local legal requirements, as in cases like \textsc{Subway Rider}. To tease out the putative difference here, we must say more about what normalization in the relevant sense consists in. Our proposal, sketched in \S 3.2, was to say that

\(^{37}\) To be clear, my point isn’t to deny that everyday communicative interactions, in which no-one is speaking from an authoritative position, contribute to identity-based discrimination. There are various accounts in the literature of how this occurs – see in particular Mary Kate McGowan, “Oppressive Speech”, \emph{Australasian Journal of Philosophy} 87/3 (2009): 389–407 – and Maitra’s account subtly analyses the social dynamics that are involved in a specific subset of these communicative processes. What I am resisting is the idea that the phenomenon of concern to Maitra is one where formally illegitimate acts, e.g. illegal forms of racial discriminatory conduct, are really, in a strict sense, having legitimacy – even just ersatz legitimacy, or pseudo-legitimacy – conferred upon them.
“A legitimates x” is true in cases where A effectively represents x as descriptively normal to some audience. But notice that one could, without too much conceptual disfigurement, say that the racist old man on the subway effectively represents discriminatory verbal attacks on Muslims as being a normal thing to do in that context. If this qualifies as an instance of normalization, then an account of legitimation as normalization will become untenable, for much the same reasons as with the previous account.

One could run with this insight, and propose that every public act is in some measure self-normalizing, insofar as the very performance of an act makes it seem normal on the occasion of its own performance. But that would be an overreaction. Consider the following example. Two primary school teachers, Lucy and Luke, tell made-up stories to their classes at recess each day. Once or twice a week Lucy’s stories involve criminal characters. She loves to tell cops and robbers-type stories, let’s imagine. By contrast, Luke’s stories involve criminal characters only very rarely, e.g. once a year. Suppose that, in a given year, every criminal character that appears in either teacher’s stories is assigned a name which suggests that he is a member of a marginalized ethnic minority group. It seems to me that there is an important difference in the representational content of Luke’s and Lucy’s stories, with respect to the relation between ethnicity and criminality. We can still find fault with Luke’s story, of course, but intuitively it seems apt to say that Lucy’s many stories normalize a prejudicial view of ethnic minorities in a way that Luke’s one story doesn’t. This linguistic intuition owes to the fact that our concept of normality is, in part, about statistical frequency. One cannot represent x as normal without making some kind of representation as to the frequency of x’s occurrence, relative to some reference point, e.g. the frequency of some other thing’s occurrence.38

It would be difficult – and moreover, it would be overestimating the granularity of our linguistic intuitions about a relatively esoteric concept and term – to postulate necessary and sufficient conditions for “A normalizes x”. But we may still be able to articulate rough rules of thumb for the concept’s application. First, one or two instances of φ-ing, by a lone actor, in a context, C, where there is a general recognition that φ-ing is prohibited, are not sufficient to normalize φ-ing in the relevant sense, i.e. to make it seem to others that the ordinary thing to do in C is to φ, rather than to not φ. There must enough instances of φ-

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38 Granted, there is a sense in which we might want to say that someone normalizes φ-ing for B if one represents it as being a more normal practice than B antecedently took it to be. This way of understanding the concept of normalization does tie it to statistical frequency, but given my remarks above, we will want to hold this apart as a distinct conception of our concept. Adherence to social norms results from people believing that a majority of others are following suit (see note 31). If we want to understand legitimation in terms of normalization, and if we allow that normalization sometimes just means making something appear a little bit more normal than others once believed, then we will have cases in which A legitimates φ-ing, even though A’s representation of φ-ing doesn’t cause others to feel any of the crowd-following compulsion which is essential to the account that I am presenting.
ing to properly represent it as the normal practice in C. Second, a bare statement that \( \varphi \)-ing is normal, if there is a general background recognition that \( \varphi \)-ing is prohibited, is not enough to normalize \( \varphi \)-ing in the relevant sense. Roughly, in order to normalize \( \varphi \)-ing, it isn’t sufficient to tell others that \( \varphi \)-ing is statistically commonplace. Rather, one must somehow demonstratively show that it is commonplace (assuming, of course, that we define ‘showing’ in non-factive terms).

If A is able to normalize \( \varphi \)-ing, for B, in a way that satisfies these rules of thumb, then I think we may also say that A has legitimated \( \varphi \)-ing for B. By representing \( \varphi \)-ing as something normal, mundane, routine, and statistically commonplace, despite its formal proscription, A gives B the impression that \( \varphi \)-ing is de facto permissible, and – crucially – that its de facto permissibility for B, much like its de jure impermissibility for B, obtains in a way that is insensitive to the deliverances of B’s own reasoning about whether \( \varphi \)-ing ought to be allowed.\(^{39}\)

Now, there will be more to say about how those exposed to such representations ought to respond. We may want to leave room to say that B was careless, or even motivatedly obtuse, in treating A’s representation of matters as informative, reliable, or in some other way a proper basis for action.\(^{40}\) But we can

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\(^{39}\) The account I’ve presented draws heavily from claims by feminist critics about the sense in which pornography can legitimate formally proscribed wrongs. When MacKinnon, Langton and others put a fine point on what kind of authority pornographers possess, they often discuss the domain-specific nature of knowledge about sex, and the uniquely influential position of pornographers in shaping attitudes about sex. Sex happens behind closed doors, depictions of it are taboo, and sex education is often piecemeal. For all these reasons, the depictions of sex we find in pornography – on which the abuse of women is normalized – end up being our culture’s closest thing to a definitive characterization of sex. Pornographers lack formal authority, but this isn’t the important thing; rather, “what is important is… whether it is authoritative for the hearers that count: people, men, boys, who… want to know which moves in the sexual game are legitimate. What is important is whether it is authoritative for those hearers who – one way or another – do seem to learn that violence is sexy and coercion legitimate”; see Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts”, at 311-12. Naturally, these sorts of claims about what pornography does are contestable. Some authors view pornography as a more multivalenced – and thus in some areas, not so straightforwardly pernicious – type of representation, e.g. see Susan Sonntag, “The Pornographic Imagination” in \textit{Styles of Radical Will} (London: Penguin, 2009 [1969]); Leslie Green, “Pornographies”, \textit{Journal of Political Philosophy} 8/1 (2000): 27-52. But suffice it to say, if one reads pornographic texts the way the anti-pornography feminists do, they’re just the kind of thing that could normalize and thus legitimize formally proscribed practices, e.g. of sexual violence, in a way that matches the phenomenon I’ve been characterizing.

\(^{40}\) We may, further, want to interrogate the systematic ‘epistemologies of ignorance’ via which perniciously misleading representations of oppressed groups are taken up by people who could recognise them as such, were they to make a more conscientious effort at seeing things as they are; see Charles Mills, “White Ignorance” in Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana (Eds.), \textit{Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance} (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), at 11-38.
do that without rushing ahead to a questionable, further conclusion: that the legitimacy φ-ing gains is something that B himself bestows on it.\footnote{Bauer suggests that an appeal to the language of legitimation inexorably pushes us towards this diagnosis; no actor that isn’t formally invested with the power to authorize wrongful, prohibited acts, she says, can be ascribed such authority “apart from individuals’ granting it to them”; see “How to do Things with Pornography”, at 87.}

To illustrate, imagine that B is a student in a philosophy graduate research program. Let’s assume that he recognizes, as part of his background understanding of how people are required to interact in educational institutions, that barking gratuitous insults at people one disagrees with is a borderline case of harassment (or some related type of proscribed conduct). But suppose B also often observes cases of professors in his program – people who are, to all appearances, in good standing in his institution, and the profession at large – barking gratuitous insults at their interlocutors in seminars. It may be less than fully epistemically or ethically assiduous for B to form the belief that this is normal way of things in philosophy seminars, and to regard it as pseudo-legitimate conduct in light of that. But it doesn’t follow that B has bestowed that sense of legitimacy on it himself. The context and its conventions are presented to B in such a way that the routine doxastic processes, through which all of us non-sceptically observe and metabolize information about how things stand in the world, cause B to regard Q&A tantrums as descriptively normal, and hence ersatz legitimate – the kind of thing he himself would be permitted to do, and certainly to tolerate – irrespective of the background normative standards that are in play. (On which of course it isn’t acceptable to treat one’s colleagues in a university like this.) To say that this conduct is legitimated for B isn’t a tendentious way of blaming others for attitudes that B himself has originated. It is, rather, an illuminating way of characterizing the sense in which B’s stance on the de facto permissibility of this conduct has been handed down to him, independently of his own take on matters.

5. Conclusion

We started with a prima facie perplexing question: how do we understand the meaning of claims that have the form “A legitimates x”, in cases where x stands for something that is recognized as formally as illegitimate in the relevant context? Among other things, we wanted to address the worry that claims of this form might merely be a misleadingly embellished way of saying “A endorses x”. One type of phenomenon that legitimation-talk may be used to refer to is the one where an actor without any recognized authority manages to win a kind of transient, circumstantial, de facto leadership in a particular context, and to use that to lend support to some formally proscribed act. Another type of phenomenon that legitimation-talk may be used to refer to is the one where some actor – or more often, some group of actors – suc-
ceeds in representing x as being an ordinary or customary practice, notwithstanding its formal proscription. I have identified some comparative advantages in an account of “A legitimates x” which is formulated with reference to the latter phenomenon. We needn’t be misappropriating the notion of legitimacy, in using the term “legitimation” to refer to normalization in the sense that I have characterized it. And that’s because the type of displacement of people’s own reasoning about their conduct which occurs when things are normalized bears a meaningful resemblance to the displacement which occurs in an exercise of bona fide authority.

While the account that I have presented here can be used to address a certain sort of sceptical stance, which sees legitimation-talk as nothing but a rhetorical tool for denouncing speech that one opposes, my purpose in formulating this account isn’t to vindicate every claim about the bad legitimating effects of speech. My aim is to put us in a better position to assess such claims. When we find people making claims about legitimation, and when it looks like they are meaning to deploy the term in our target sense, we should assess the plausibility of their claims, to a first approximation, by considering whether and how the alleged ‘legitimators’ are able to have their representations of what goes on in the relevant domain taken up as descriptively accurate by some audience. The underlying ethos here is about preserving a certain level of discipline in our normative political vocabulary. If someone says that a speaker is legitimating an oppressive practice – and if this claim is used to argue for a controversial program of political action – then we need a way of evaluating the charge. Evaluation becomes possible if and to the extent that the meaning of the pivotal term is specified with reference to some identifiable phenomenon, such that we can then say how the world needs to stand in order for a statement that “A legitimates x” to be true. The romantic poet Percy Bysshe Shelley famously said “poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world”.42 It is a stirring sentiment, but it doesn’t look like something we could verify or falsify. And notice how some claims about ‘legitimation’ seem similar at first blush. Like Shelley’s remark, the claim that hate speech legitimates discrimination, or that pornography legitimates violence, attributes a transformative power to certain actors – a power that involves determining what others may do. Given the further implications of such claims, we should make sure that they aren’t confined to the realm of the purely rhetorical or poetic. Explicating the meaning of the concept of legitimation in terms of the phenomenon of normalization is a step in that direction.